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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Priority No. 2
v.
RENALD S. HASTIE,

Case No. 950630-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF APPEAL
Defendant appeals his convictions for two third-degree felonies, one for
aggravated assault and one for failure to respond to a peace officer, and a class C
misdemeanor for driving without a license. This Court has original appellate
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
APPELLATE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Are Hastie's claims on appeal, other than his challenge to the court's

jurisdiction, waived due to his failure to preserve them at the trial court?
Although no standard of review is applicable because this issue did not come
before the trial court, the State refers the Court to State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d
900, 903 (Utah App. 1994), cert, granted 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), which

discusses in some detail the doctrine of waiver due to failure to preserve issues at
trial.
2. Has defendant met his burden to disprove the absence of jurisdiction?
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a matter of law that this Court determines on
its own. State Department of Social Services v. V p . 784 P.2d 1130, 1133
(Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1995)
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1995)
Utah R. Crim.P. 23 (1995)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
On July 20, 1995, a jury convicted defendant of failing to respond to a
peace officer, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la1316 (1993); aggravated assault, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1995); and failure to obtain a drivers' license, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-202 (Supp. 1995) (R. 132).
Defendant represented himself at the trial but had the assistance of an attorney,
2

Tony B. Miles, who made the opening statement and closing argument (R. 13132). Neither one objected to the jury instructions nor requested lesser-included
instructions (R. 447).
Defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment more than a month later, but
the trial court denied it and sentenced defendant to two concurrent zero-to-five
year sentences at the prison for the third-degree felonies and one concurrent
three-month sentence for the misdemeanor (R. 188-89).
Statement of Facts
Defendant was a fugitive from justice with a warrant out for his arrest,
when Officer Shane Miner of the Northern Utah Criminal Apprehension Team
(NUCAT) saw him driving down Monroe Boulevard in Ogden on January 30,
1995 (R. 330). Because defendant was considered potentially violent, Officer
Miner, who was driving an unmarked car, did not immediately arrest him, but
followed him to a residence on the 2000 block of Adams (R. 331). Defendant
got out of his car and went into the house and Officer Miner parked in a cemetery
nearby to watch and call for backup (R. 331). Just a few minutes later, before
backup arrived, defendant returned to his car and started driving, going east on
20th (id.). Officer Miner followed and was eventually joined by Officer Arthur
Weloth of the Ogden City Police (R. 334). They decided that Officer Weloth, in
3

a marked car, should turn on his lights and siren and try to make a traffic stop

GdJ.
As soon as Officer Weloth turned on his red and blue lights, defendant
accelerated from 35 mph to 45 mph (R. 367); when the officer turned on his
siren, defendant sped up even more and, at one point, defendant was going 60 to
70 mph on Harrison Boulevard in afternoon, rush-hour traffic, weaving around
cars, and going through at least half a dozen red lights and stop signs (R. 370).
Officer Jack Alexander of the Ogden City Police heard about the chase on
his radio while patrolling around Weber State University (R. 405). Officer
Alexander started in pursuit (id.'). Officer Alexander was driving toward
defendant on Harrison Boulevard in the opposing traffic lane and hoped that
defendant would stop when he saw a police car in front of him (R. 407). Instead,
as their cars came closer, defendant moved over to Officer Alexander's lane of
travel (R. 409). When Officer Alexander swerved to get out of defendant's way,
defendant would swerved back so as to still be directly headed toward the
officer's lane (id.). This back-and-forth swerving continued several times (id.).
When defendant's car was "inches, maybe a foot" from the officer's, Officer
Alexander jerked his car to the right, hitting the curb to avoid colliding with
defendant (R. 409-10). Because of the potential danger to the police and the
4

public, the duty lieutenant called off the chase (R. 411). Defendant drove away
(R. 411).
Officer Miner drove to Karen Durham's home because he believed
defendant might go there (R. 337). Because defendant was at the home, Officer
Miner called for backup, put on his raid jacket and vest, and secured the outside
of the home. When Officer Miner knocked on the front door, calling for
defendant to come out, defendant tried to escape through the back door but was
apprehended.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because defendant failed to raise any of his appellate issues before the trial
court, his appeal should be rejected on the long-standing principle that, unless a
defendant preserves his challenges at trial, he cannot raise them on appeal. Even
if this Court chooses to evaluate defendant's substantive issues, however, none of
them have legal or factual merit; therefore, the appeal could also be rejected on
substantive grounds.
Nevertheless, defendant challenges the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time, and, therefore, must be reviewed
on the merits. Because the trial court was a court of general jurisdiction, the law

5

presumes it had jurisdiction. Defendant has the burden to disprove it, which he
cannot.
Even if this Court chooses to evaluate defendant's substantive issues,
however, none of them have legal or factual merit; therefore, the appeal could
also be rejected on those grounds.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO
APPELLATE REVIEW BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
OBJECT IN THE TRIAL COURT.1

On appeal, defendant makes several claims that he did not raise to the trial
court before or during trial. This is a fundamental error that applies to all
defendant's posited issues. Because he did not preserve his issues at trial,
reviewing those claims on appeal would fly in the face of the long-standing
principle that claims raised for the first time on appeal will not be heard absent
plain error or exceptional circumstances. State v. Labrum. 881 P.2d 900, 903
(Utah App. 1994) (due to defendant's failure to object to jury instructions,
"defendant will not now be heard to complain that the judge erroneously
instructed the jury."), cert, granted 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). Defendant has not

1

This point addresses a fundamental error in defendant's case that relates to all
defendant's point headings, except the one relating to subject matter jurisdiction.

6

argued plain error or exceptional circumstances. He has, therefore, waived his
right to challenge the court's actions on appeal. However, for the convenience of
the Court, the State will address the merits of defendant's challenges.

n.

DEFENDANT'S APPELLATE CLAIMS ARE
WITHOUT MERIT AND SHOULD BE REJECTED.
A.

The State was not restricted to charging
defendant with assault on a peace officer,
a class A misdemeanor, merely because
the victim of defendant's aggravated
assault happened to be a peace officer.2

Defendant asserts that his conviction for aggravated assault is fatally
flawed because he was not properly charged with that offense. Brief of
Defendant at 9. He claims that he should have been charged, and therefore
convicted of, the allegedly more specific crime of assault on a peace officer,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4 (1995). The latter crime makes it a class A
misdemeanor to assault a peace officer "with knowledge that he is a peace
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a
peace officer." LL
The State agrees with defendant that his conduct constituted an assault on a
peace officer. Officer Alexander was driving a marked police car when

2

This issue corresponds to defendant's point one.
7

defendant tried to hit him; it was also evident that Officer Alexander was working
within the scope of his authority by trying to stop defendant (R. 427-28
(defendant's testimony)). Nevertheless, the mere happenstance that defendant
committed one crime in the course of doing another does not necessarily mean
that the State can only charge defendant with the lesser-punishment crime.
Taking defendant's argument to its logical conclusion means that a person who
commits conduct constituting an aggravated assault could never be charged with
that crime if the victim was an on-duty peace officer.3
In State v. Clark. 632 P.2d 841, 843-44 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme
Court dealt with a similar argument from a defendant who asserted that he should
have been charged with cruelty to animals, a misdemeanor, rather than theft of
livestock, a felony, because "he could have been prosecuted 'under the same set
of facts'" for the misdemeanor. The Court rejected this assertion, ruling that
"[a]s long as the legislative classifications are not arbitrary, the fact that conduct
may violate both a general and a specific provision of the criminal law does not
render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one violation is subject to a

3

Defendant's logic apparently would prohibit aggravated assault charges against
people who commit an "aggravated assault" against correctional officers, Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-102.6 (1995) or school employees, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.3 (1995).
8

greater sentence." dark, 632 P.2d at 844 (citing People v. Burns. 598 P.2d 351
(Colo. 1979).
Contrary to defendant's claims, it is not so clear that the "assault against a
peace officer" statute is the more specific of the two statutes because it does not
describe the precise conduct defendant committed. i.e., using a dangerous
weapon, i.e., a car, likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. The
"lesser" statute is more specific only in the sense that it covers peace officers; the
aggravated assault statute, however, more specifically describes defendant's
conduct.
B.

The 1995 amendments to the aggravated
assault statute were not applied to
defendant; therefore, no ex post facto
violation occurred.4

In 1995, the legislature amended section 76-5-103 to make it a seconddegree felony when a person "intentionally causes serious bodily injury to
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(2) (Supp. 1995). Defendant claims that
this amendment was applied to him and, therefore, caused a violation of the ex
post facto clause. This claim is factually incorrect. The State charged defendant
with a third-degree felony under the part of the aggravated assault statute not

4

This point corresponds to defendant's point two.
9

effected by the amendment, i.e., use of a dangerous weapon likely to produce
death or serious bodily injury (R. 2). Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(3) (Supp.
1995). This charge was the basis for the jury's verdict, (R. 150), and defendant
was sentenced in accordance with that verdict to a zero-to-five year term of
imprisonment (R. 190). Thus, defendant was never subjected to the seconddegree felony allowed by the amendment and the ex post facto clause was not
violated.
C.

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 (1995) does
not create a presumption of guilt.5

Defendant alleges that the following language in section 41-6-13.5 creates
a presumption of guilt: "[a]ny operator who, having received a visual or audible
signal from a peace officer . . . operates his vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard of the signal... or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer . . . is
guilty of a felony of the third degree." Defendant is mistaken. The phrase "is
guilty of" is merely a grammatical construction that explains the consequences of
committing the previously-mentioned prohibited acts. It is legislative language
that serves two purposes: it tells members of the public what will happen if they
flee a peace officer and it tells the courts what penalty to impose if a person is

5

Corresponding to defendant's point three.
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found guilty of committing those acts. The statute does not require the courts to
presume guilt and leaves to the judiciary the duty to find guilt under constitutional
standards.
D.

The jury's instruction on "evidence" did
not need to define the evidence that the
jury had to rely on because other
instructions spelled out the State's
burden of proof.6

Defendant's fourth argument suggests that the trial court erred by failing to
give a "burden of proof instruction. This is not true. In fact, several jury
instructions set out the State's "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden (R. 144, 147,
149, 150, 151, 154). The trial court also gave correct element instructions (R.
149-53).
m.

THE DEFENDANT HAS NOT DISPROVED
JURISDICTION AND THE DEFENDANT'S OWN
TESTIMONY VERIFIES THAT THE INCIDENTS
OCCURRED IN WEBER COUNTY.7

Courts of general jurisdiction are presumed to have jurisdiction and the
person challenging it must disprove it. State Department of Social Services v.
Vigil. 784 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Utah 1989). The trial court in this case is a court of

6

This point refers to defendant's point four.

7

This point refers to defendant's point five.
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general jurisdiction. Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5 (1984); Utah Code Ann. 78-34(1) (Supp. 1995). Defendant has not presented any evidence to disprove
jurisdiction; indeed, his testimony confirms that all incidents occurred in Ogden,
Utah, a part of Weber County and, therefore, within the geographical jurisdiction
of Second Judicial District Court (R. 425-33).
CONCLUSION
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLICATION NOT REQUESTED
The State does not believe oral argument would enhance the Court's
decisionmaking process because the facts and legal precepts are straightforward.
Additionally, the State does not believe publication would significantly further the
development of the law or aid courts or practitioners.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS i i ^ d a y of feferaw7l996.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
JAMES H. BEADLES
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM

1
76-1-201. Jurisdiction of offenses.
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, while
either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of another for which he is legally
accountable, if:
(a) The offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; or
(b) The conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense within the state;
or
(c) The conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense within the
state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or
(d) The conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit
in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this state and such other jurisdiction.
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct which is an element
of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within this state. In homicide the
"result" is either the physical contact which causes death, or the death itself; and if the body of a
homicide victim is found within the state, the death shall be presumed to have occurred within
the state.
(3) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this
state is committed within the state regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the
omission.

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

1
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer.
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace officer, and when
the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a peace officer, is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

1
76-5-103. Aggravated assault
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a dangerous
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 10; 1989,
ch. 170, §2; 1995, ch. 291, §5.
Amendment Notes. - The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added "under circumstances not
amounting to a violation of Subsection (1)(a)" to the beginning of Subsection (1)(b); substituted "A violation
of Subsection (1)(a)" for "Aggravated assault" and "second degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2);
and added Subsection (3).

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michic Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc. and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

1

Rule 23. Arrest of judgment
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court upon its own
initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant shall, arrest judgment if the
facts proved or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the defendant
is mentally ill, or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment.
Upon arresting judgment the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a commitment until
the defendant is charged anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may
be just and proper under the circumstances.

(c) 1953-1996 by The Michie Company, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

